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In this book, Husain Sarkar offers a remarkable look into the groundwork of virtue ethics.
Especially focusing on theories proposed by Julia Annas and Rosalind Hursthouse, he examines a multiplicity of cardinal tenets of virtue ethics by bringing five cardinal objections – namely, the self-defeating objection, the circularity objection, the moral relativism objection, the explanatory poverty objection, and the inconsistent advice objection – to bear upon them. These objections define the shape, scope, and substance of the book. Collectively, they unveil several fault lines, a few hitherto unsuspected. Sarkar argues that notwithstanding the novel, intriguing answers to old, familiar ethical questions, the answers are so fraught with difficulties, that virtue ethics – as a philosophical moral tradition – is best seen as badly in need of repair and reformation. Perhaps, this book may provoke a Renaissance in the field of virtue ethics.
This book offers a unique look into virtue ethics, exploring why this tradition is in need of repair, renewal, and reformation.
Provides the first in-depth, critical examination dissecting the tradition of virtue ethics
Analyzes and evaluates the work of foundational virtue ethicists Julia Annas and Rosalind Hursthouse
Preface
Part I: A Bit of Background
Chapter 1: Two Irreconcilable Principles
Part II: Julia Annas
Chapter 2: Virtuous Person, The Circularity Objection, and The Moral Relativism Objection
Chapter 3: The Just Soul, the Community, and The Circularity Objection
Part III: Rosalind Hursthouse
Chapter 4: Right Action and Explanatory Models
Chapter 5: Moral Conflicts and Moral Dilemmas
Part IV: The Unique Moral Problem
Chapter 6: The Unique Moral Problem and Three Traditional Solutions
Part V: Does Virtue Ethics Have a Solution?
Chapter 7: Annas’ (Possible) Solutions
Chapter 8: Hursthouse’s (Possible) Solutions
Chapter 9: Can Virtue Ethics Save Us from Moral Nihilism?
Bibliography
Name Index
Subject Index
About the Author
In The Pitfalls of Virtue Ethics, Husain Sarkar offers a thoughtful critique of virtue ethics, questioning whether it can achieve what he views as the central aim of moral philosophy: providing a satisfactory account of right action. By focusing on five key objections, the author argues that virtue ethics is not a viable alternative to deontology. Sarkar’s use of fiction and his clear, engaging writing style make the work accessible to a non-specialist audience. A valuable contribution to the field.
The Pitfalls of Virtue Ethics argues that virtue ethics is ‘inherently’ flawed and that its aims are ‘vitiated by its own norms, principles, or standards.’ Husain Sarkar makes his case with care and nuance, focusing on the work of the two doyens of virtue ethics, Julian Annas and Rosalind Hursthouse.