Ebook
In the past five years, Russia, China, and others have accelerated their development of hypersonic missiles to threaten U.S. forces in the homeland and abroad. The current Ballistic Missile Defense System, largely equipped to contend with legacy ballistic missile threats, must be adapted to this challenge. The same characteristics that make hypersonic missiles attractive may also hold the key to defeating them. This CSIS report argues how a new hypersonic defense architecture should exploit hypersonic weapons’ unique vulnerabilities and employ new capabilities, such as a space sensor layer, to secure critical nodes. These changes are not only necessary to mitigate the hypersonic threat but to defeat an emerging generation of maneuvering missiles and aerial threats.
List of Figures V
Introduction 1
Findings 3
1 | An Attribute, Not a Thing 5
Taxonomy Blurring into Spectrum 8
Vulnerabilities of Hypersonic Flight 10
Defense Is Possible 13
2 | The Current Programmatic Context 17
Space Sensors 19
Interceptor Development 23
Command and Control 27
Budget Outlook 28
3 | Channeling the Threat 29
Encouraging Maneuver 30
Mobility and Distribution 32
4 | Exploiting New Failure Modes 34
Area-Wide Effects 35
Twenty-First Century Flak 37
Directed Energy 38
Modular Payloads 39
5 | Reformulating the Mission 41
Preferential Defense 42
Passive Defense and Deception 42
Missile Defeat 43
Data, Doctrine, and Organization 43
6 | International Cooperation and the Industrial Base 45
Conclusion: A Difficult but Tractable Problem 48
About the Authors 50
Endnotes 51
Tom Karako is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Masao Dahlgren is a research associate with the Missile Defense Project at CSIS.